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1 INTRODUCTION
Open any medieval textbook and you will find that
the fourteenth century is referred to as a period of ‘cri-
sis.’ England, specifically, faced wars with France and
Scotland, climatic changes, several devastating famines,
and, of course, the Black Death1;2;3. Being a peasant in
medieval England was no easy task, especially during
such arduous times. Throughout the thirteenth century,
there had been population growth, increased agricul-
tural output, the development of widespread market
networks, and the rise in the number of people depen-
dent on the market for food1. It was a booming time.
All of this expansion did not survive the chaos of the
fourteenth century because, as Barbara F. Harvey notes,
in the decades prior to the arrival of the Black Death,
the “expansive economic trends of the earlier Middle
Ages were first halted and then put into reverse”4. Pop-
ulation growth stalled and started to decrease with the
Great Famine; laborers’ wages were low; prices were
high5. All this combined to make life rather bleak for
the average peasants even before the arrival of the Black
Death.
The Black Death originated in the Caucasus region in
1346 where it began to ravage the population. As people
and goods moved west along trade routes, they brought
with them the bacterium Yersinia pestis; Gabriele de’
Mussis, from Piancenza, Italy, noted that “it was as
if they had brought evil spirits with them: every city,
every settlement, every place was poisoned by the
contagious pestilence, and their inhabitants, both men
and women, died suddenly"6. By 1348, the plague was
working its way across Continental Europe. Geoffrey
le Baker, a clerk of Swinbrook in Oxfordshire, explains
that “at last fierce destruction came to the countries
beyond the Alps, and from there, in stages to western
France and Germany, and in the seventh year since its
beginning, to England”7. In the summer of 1348 sources
report its arrival in England through the port at Mel-
combe in the southern county of Dorset. The Francis-
cans of Lynn chronicled the arrival of the plague and
noted that “two ships. . . landed at Melcombe in Dorset a
little before Midsummer. In them were sailors from Gas-
cony who were infected with an unheard of epidemic
illness called pestilence"8. From there, the plague began
to spread northward and devastate all of England, as
Geoffrey le Baker recorded:
"First it virtually stripped a Dorset seaport and
then its hinterland of the inhabitants, and then
it ravaged Devon and Somerset up to Bristol.
As a result, the people of Gloucester denied
admission to people from Bristol, believing
that the breath of those who had lived among
the dying would be infectious. But in the end,
Gloucester, and then Oxford and London too,
and finally the whole of England were so vio-
lently attacked that scarcely a tenth of either
sex survived7."
The plague ended its devastation in England a year
after it arrived in the south9. According to sources such
as Thomas Stubbs, the chronicler for the archbishop of
York in c.1373, it finally reached the northern city of
York in late May 1349 before dying out sometime in late
July10.
Coming on the heels of devastating famines and wars,
the arrival of the plague only made life more difficult for
the peasants. According to John of Reading, a monk of
Westminster, “ulcers broke out in the groin and armpit,
which tortured the dying for three days”11. Which, as
the chronicler Robert of Avesbury notes, “remov[ed]
them from human concerns in the course of a morn-
ing”12. While we know now that the Black Death killed
somewhere between a third and a half of the popula-
tion3, people in the fourteenth century, surrounded by
all the death at the time, were terrified. Some, such as
the chronicler, Ralph Higden, estimated “that scarcely a
tenth of mankind was left alive” by the time the plague
ended. Thus, by the middle of the fourteenth century,
in addition to the stresses brought on by the stagnating
economy, English peasants were worried about dying,
their family and friends dying, and what life they would
have after the disease ended13. They had no idea if they
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would survive the pandemic or what would be left of
the world if they did.
If they survived the plague, however, peasants were
actually presented with surprisingly robust economic
opportunities. Land availability increased after the
Black Death, allowing peasants to rent and cultivate
larger plots. Laborers were in high demand and that
gave them the power to negotiate for better terms and
higher wages. After living with the difficulties of a de-
clining economy and the plague, life seemed to be get-
ting better. But that was not to be. The early promise of
the post-Black Death benefits such as increasing wages,
decreasing prices, improved standards of living, and
increased personal freedoms, was not to be. Instead,
wages rose for a short period after the plague before
stagnating; prices rose and continued to rise for decades;
standards of living only slightly improved; and peas-
ants continued to be repressed. All this begs the ques-
tion: why did the expected benefits of the Black Death
prove to be so short-lived? Why did life not dramat-
ically improve for the survivors? These are the core
questions that this paper will seek to answer.
To answer these questions, it is necessary to look be-
yond the peasants and economic theories to another
key actor of the time: the Crown. What becomes clear
is that Edward III, king of England since 1327, and his
ministers could not allow the economy to function on
its own. With no concept of laissez-faire, they meddled
with prices and wages, interfering with the natural ram-
ifications of the mass mortality caused by the Black
Death. What drove them to these actions? Above all,
it was about maintaining the status quo, a system that
the elites of society, the king included, had created to
ensure their position in society. The king meddled with
the economy by introducing new regulations in order
to appease the elites, who faced financial and social
losses after the plague. He did this because in the es-
tablished social order he depended on the support of
the aristocracy to govern as he pleased. Edward III had
specific policy priorities in the mid-fourteenth century,
such as controlling the economy and fighting France
in the Hundred Year’s War, which he could not under-
take without the backing of England’s elites. What I
argue, therefore, is that it was Edward III’s continued
institutional repression of the peasantry in the wake of
the Black Death that explains the failure of post-plague
social and economic mobility. By maintaining the status
quo via economic and legal measures, Edward III en-
sured the support of the upper echelons of society at the
expense of the peasantry. In so doing, I seek to bridge
the gap that exists in the current scholarship between
economic history and politico-legal history. By exam-
ining the motivations of Edward III and the English
aristocracy, I demonstrate both the centrality of the En-
glish crown to late medieval economics and the ways
in which the goals and motivation of elites impacted
the lives of people in every station, just as dramatically
as any plague.
2 THE AFTERMATH OF THE PLAGUE
The Black Death spread quickly through England after
its arrival in the summer of 1348, lasting about a year,
and killing between thirty and fifty percent of the pop-
ulation8;7;9;14;3. This mass mortality impacted the peas-
ants immediately. They had endured low wages and
harsh working conditions throughout the first half of
the fourteenth century due to high population rates and
competition for work5. When the plague swept through
England, the surviving peasants were presented with
more opportunities for work and the possibility to nego-
tiate for higher wages, which in turn gave them a chance
for social mobility5;15. However, as I will discuss below,
this rise in peasant influence was only short-lived. En-
glish elites worked to minimize the increased status of
peasants to maintain the status quo as it had been for
generations.
The mass mortality generated a higher demand for
labor. In order to retain workers, employers had to pay
more, and thus, peasants were able to secure higher
wages. This was especially significant in agrarian ar-
eas because the lords needed tenants and laborers to
work their land. Without enough tenants and labor-
ers, not all the land would be worked and that which
was worked would not have been taken care of at the
same level as before the plague16;17. This meant that the
food supply would not only decrease in the first year
after the Black Death, but continue to be diminished
in subsequent years, because the pre-plague levels of
production were not recovered16. But even beyond this
concern for subsistence, the landowners’ were worried
about the financial impacts the plague would have on
their estates. They lost out on revenue from both rents
and the sale of crops from their own lands due to the
mortality of numerous tenants and the subsequent fall
in agricultural production. According to an inquiry un-
dertaken by the exchequer, for example, the Bishop of
Worcester lost “£84 4s ½d [84 pounds, four shillings,
and half a pence]. . . because of the lack of tenants who
used to pay the rent and of customary tenants who used
to perform the labor services” in the immediate after-
math of the plague18. This was a loss of nearly seventy
percent of the expected income of that land (“£123 16s
2d”)18; and that sum of just over £84 was the equivalent
to at least 4210 days, or about 11½ years, of wages for a
skilled tradesman19. When landowners then needed to
pay more for labor, their income further decreased.
English elites were clearly displeased about having
to pay their laborers more. The chronicler in Rochester
noted that “such a shortage of workers ensued that
the humble turned up their noses at employment, and
could scarcely be persuaded to serve the eminent unless
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for triple wages”20. This chronicler, one William de la
Dene, a monk and member of the wealthy Cathedral Pri-
ory of Rochester, clearly writes from the perspective of
the elites. The lowest in society, or the “humble,” were
expected to take whatever opportunities were offered
to them by those higher in society, or the “eminent,”
because it was what had been done for generations.
This division was, in fact, the bedrock principle of me-
dieval society, which as Marc Bloch describes it, was
“divided into three ‘orders’: those who prayed, those
who fought, and those who worked”21. Elites saw the
peasant’s demands for higher wages as an affront to this
established order of society; from their viewpoint, the
peasants were being greedy by trying to get more out of
life than their position in society allowed for. Peasants
saw the post-Black Death situation as a time to hope
for a better life as more opportunities presented them-
selves. And so, they were able to do something new
and make demands of the landholders which, if met,
would have improved their standards of living. These
changes in peasant attitudes towards the elites caused
the landowners significant financial losses. Moreover,
the economic changes in the wake of the Black Death
also had the potential to result in a loss of social sta-
tus for the elites and even the potential for complete
societal upheaval. If the peasants could increase their
standing in society, the difference between them and
the elites would shrink, thereby diminishing the im-
portance and power that the elites held in society22.
Landowners, concerned with their own well-being in
the post-Black Death economy and society, implored
the king to help them maintain their status.
3 MEDDLING THE POST-BLACK DEATH
ECONOMY
And Edward III did help the nobles. It is this move by
elites and subsequently by the king to prevent a dis-
ruption of social hierarchy that can help explain the
key conundrum regarding wages in the period after the
Black Death that is at the heart of this paper. Despite
the peasants leveraging their newfound power to get
higher wages and opportunities for social mobility, the
aftermath of the Black Death was not the beginning of
a new social order. Wages rose for peasants, but only
for a couple of years; then they remained stagnant for
two decades5. In 1347, the wages for mowing and reap-
ing wheat were 5d and 5¾d per acre, respectively; the
wages for the same work in 1350 were 11d and 7¾d per
acre. However, in 1352 the wages for mowing and reap-
ing wheat were 6¼d and 6½d per acre, respectively; and
those wages fluctuated very little until 1371 when the
wages for that work were 8d and 11d23. What caused
wages to stagnate this way when their rising seems so
natural after the plague? Christopher Dyer, one of the
foremost scholars in economic and social history of me-
dieval England, offers a few potential explanations for
this: perhaps, he argues, previously unemployed peo-
ple filled the gaps left in the labor market after the Black
Death. But this is unlikely because wages were not at
rock-bottom prior to 1348. Alternatively, he suggests
that “social and institutional restraints” worked to keep
the wages down23. I would argue that this is far more
likely to be the case, with the institutional restraints that
Dyer refers to being the Crown’s interventions in the
labor economy to stop the rising wages after the plague.
Edward III meddled with the English economy by in-
troducing new regulations that disrupted the natural
course of the impacts of the Black Death. He did this
in order to maintain the established social order, which
was upset when the peasantry gained more influence
in society after the plague. The king was concerned
with the lives of nobles and how they affected his own
standing in society and his ability to govern; he was
far less concerned with the lives of peasants. Edward
III based his post-Black Death management of the En-
glish government and economy on these priorities. And
so, though rising wages should have been an expected
repercussion of the mass mortality, rather than a boost
in their livelihood, peasants quickly found themselves
repressed once more by the upper echelons of English
society.
Intent on maintaining their finances and social sta-
tus, the nobility wasted no time taking their concerns
about peasant wages to the king, and he wasted no
time drafting a response to the problem. In 1349, as
the plague still ravaged England, the Crown issued the
“Ordinance of Laborers,” which ordered that “work-
ers take only the wages, livery, meed, or salary, which
were accustomed to be given in the places where he
oweth to serve, the twentieth year of our reign of Eng-
land, or five or six other commone years next before"24.
This law was an attempt to reverse the rise in wages
and return them to what they were prior to the Black
Death. However, most of the country did not abide by
this ordinance and wages continued to rise. In another
attempt to force wages down, the Crown issued the
“Statute of Laborers” in 135125. This law was written
to reiterate and enforce the “Ordinance of Laborers.”
The “Ordinance,” in 1349, had relied on local and pri-
vate enforcement, but the punishments of fines and jail
times were not implemented effectively or consistently
enough to thoroughly coerce peasants into accepting
the lower wages26. As indicated by the issuance of a sec-
ond rendition of the law, the widespread disobedience
was noticed by the Crown and rising peasant wages
continued to be a problem. The “Statute of Laborers”
goes further than the “Ordinance” in that it specifies
enforcement measures:
"The said stewards, bailiffs and constables of
the said towns be sworn before the same jus-
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tices that they will inquire diligently . . . about
all those who act contrary to the ordinance,
and that they will certify their names to the
justices whenever they come into the area to
hold their sessions, so that the said justices,
having received the names of such rebels from
the stewards, bailiffs and constables, may have
them arrested to appear before the justices and
answer for their offences, so that they may
make a fine and ransom to the king if they are
convicted, and over that let them be sent to
prison, there to remain until they find surety
that they will take employment and wages,
and carry out their work . . . in the manner
specified25."
This was a novel addition to the powers granted to
local authorities and alike, as they were now tasked
with seeking out offenders and punishing them, where
they had previously only settled disputes that were
brought to them27. The enforcement of the “Statute of
Laborers” resulted in workers having to swear twice
a year, in front of local officials, to obey the law and if
they refused, they would be fined or jailed until they
agreed, giving local officials more extensive authority
over the local laborers26. It also established a greater
system of cooperation between the royal government
and local authorities, because they now had a task that
required them to work together, rather than in opposi-
tion to each other. Because the power granted to them
in the “Statute of Laborers” came directly from the king,
the local officials now gained more authority; in a way,
local officials became agents of national authority after
the Black Death. In turn, the king gained more access to
local networks of power, heightening his own central
authority26. With the “Statute of Laborers,” the king,
with the cooperation of local authorities, was able to
effectively suppress peasant wages, not just in the im-
mediate aftermath of the plague, but for the next two
decades.
The effects of the plague disrupted English society
at a fundamental level. Peasants found a way to exert
more influence in society than they ever had before,
which undermined the system of oppression based on
status that had been in place for generations. In order
to prevent this trend of increasing peasant power from
solidifying in English society, Edward III took active
measures to maintain the status quo and appease his
noble landholders. Despite a defiant labor force, he reis-
sued failed laws attempting to restrict peasant wages
and, by extension, peasant influence. He sought pre-
viously unheard-of powers from the local elites and,
in exchange, helped entrench those same local elites.
In fact, the Crown and the elites formed a balance of
power so that they could both fulfill their needs while
also supporting each other. In the wake of the Black
Death, the nobles needed the king to help them main-
tain their estates because their power and wealth were
being threatened. The king placated them with the new
laws regulating labor because he needed the support
of the nobles to implement his political agenda. In the
middle of the fourteenth century, that agenda primarily
included an attempt to more fully control England’s
economy and to defend and expand his holdings on
the continent via war with France, both of which were
a part of his central goal of maintaining and increas-
ing his royal power. Neither the elites nor the king
could accomplish their goals without the support of
the other. Through a system of accommodations, the
ruling classes of English society, king and nobles alike,
were able to implement processes that maintained the
status quo, even in the wake of the disaster brought
about by the Black Death.
The ruling elites of England hoped to maintain their
wealth, power, and status in society by inviting greater
royal control into their economic affairs. At its core,
these elites can be divided into two categories: the no-
bles and the gentry. The nobles were those who were
granted land and titles by the king. The highest among
them were the earls, who worked closely with the king
and were often his friends, family members, and confi-
dants. Below them were the various barons, who were
distinguished from the earls by the size of their land-
holdings, their wealth, and their status – they were not
as close to the king, though they still had considerable
authority. When it came to politics, the nobles were
those who made up the House of Lords in Parliament
and had the most direct access to the king. By the end
of the fourteenth century, there were about seventy no-
ble families in England27. The gentry, then, sat below
the nobles, in terms of social hierarchy. They consisted
of all the landowners below barons but above yeomen
(those peasants who owned their own farms and thus
did not owe rent or labor on other men’s land); even
the lowest gentry would have typically owned enough
land to have tenants. Each county throughout England
typically had between fifty and seventy gentry families,
from which the local officials, such as sheriffs, justices,
and members of the House of Commons of Parliament,
were chosen27. From local officials to the whole of Par-
liament, the nobility and the gentry comprised the en-
tirety of the English political community. They not only
excluded the peasants from the decision-making pro-
cesses but maintained their own power and wealth by
profiting off their labor.
The demographic changes in the wake of the plague
threatened to upset the established societal structure,
which the nobles and gentry were accustomed to con-
trolling. It made sense for them to cooperate with the
king’s policies to control the situation because they re-
ceived their authority from the king and thus believed
in his power to preserve it. The nobles, especially, were
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chosen by the king to hold a greater amount of power.
In 1337, Edward III appointed an almost entirely new
group of earls by filling posts that were left vacant due
to the deaths of the previous earls and by creating six
new earldoms27. With these appointments often came
money and land. For example, Henry of Grosmont was
named earl of Derby and was given both the lands typi-
cally associated with that title and “1000 marks yearly
out of the king’s customs”28;27. For both the nobles and
the gentry, the political power granted to them by the
king was key to their cooperation with him. Having a
seat in Parliament gave them a say in the national gov-
ernment. It was in Parliament that laws were made. A
common issue could be presented to them and then they
would take it to the king; a statute would be written de-
pending on the king’s response, but it also had to have
the assent of both the House of Lords and the House of
Commons, the two branches of elite landholders, to be-
come an official law. Parliament was also responsible for
approving all direct taxations that the king requested29.
The monarchy gave the elites of Parliament the power
to approve taxes because direct taxation was an easier
method of raising funds than holding them accountable
to feudal obligations29. By doing this the Crown traded
some of its power over the elites in order to collect more
money from the realm in a simpler way. However, it did
mean that if the king requested taxes too often or at too
high of a rate, Parliament could refuse him. An early
example of this is from 1297 when Edward I demanded
a heavy tax, the earls refused him and blocked the col-
lection of the funds until he was willing to confirm the
charters of their land grants. Through this, the give-and-
take between the Crown and elites is clear: the charters
needed the king’s approval to be legal documents and
the earls held the purse strings29;30. During the first
half of the fourteenth century, the overall power of the
elites continued to grow as they became more central
to the governing of England. It was the maintenance
and growth of their wealth and power that was the fun-
damental concern for the nobles and gentry31. Because
these largely came from the Crown via grants of titles,
land, and opportunities for prestige, the elites were will-
ing to cooperate with the king in order to ensure that
they protected their power and place within the social
order.
While it may seem as though the king was giving a
lot of power without receiving much in return, that is
not the case. In working with the nobles, Edward III
gained support for his policies, funds from taxes, and
increased central power. By the mid-fourteenth century,
the elites throughout the country had essentially be-
come an extension of the king’s governance; this can be
seen throughout the Calendars of the Patent Rolls when
the king chose members of the gentry and nobility to
carry out his directives, such as purchasing food and
bringing it to London, collecting funds and supplies for
the ongoing war, and overseeing the implementation of
legislation and justice. But, all of this came with strings
attached. Each decision Edward III made regarding his
elites was politically calculated in order to maintain
political stability. By the mid-fourteenth century, the
English Crown could do very little without the support
of the elites because the established system required
consensus amongst those in power; kings who did not
acknowledge this found themselves in political crises.
Perhaps the best example of this is when King John
lost the support of his barons by asking too much from
them and was forced to sign the Magna Carta in 121532.
Edward III understood this when he appointed his new
nobility in 1337. He chose people for those positions
that he specifically believed would understand his deci-
sions and be loyal to him throughout his reign27. The
nobles and gentry needed to feel important to the king
and the governance of the country. Edward III gave
this to them by granting them the authorities that were
so important to them. As long as he could keep them
satisfied with their positions in society, he knew that he
would have their support. If he did not, or if he pushed
too hard against their power and privileges, he knew
that they would turn against him. He had become king
at the young age of fourteen, because the elites turned
against his father, Edward II, in a coup led by the power-
ful baron Roger Mortimer and Queen Isabella. Edward
II had favorite nobles to whom he granted immense
power and privileges, which combined with poor eco-
nomic decisions and military failure led the rest of the
elites, in the countryside as well as in the city of Lon-
don, to turn against him and support his deposers31.
The first three years of Edward III’s reign were then
ruled by his mother as regent with Mortimer as her
main advisor. It was only after Edward III staged his
own coup in 1330 that he took control of the govern-
ment27.
Throughout his reign, therefore, Edward III worked
consistently to retain the broad support of England’s
elites and to avoid the fate of his father. In the wake
of the Black Death, this was no different. The elites
were displeased with the increased influence that the
peasants attempted to take hold of because it could
have meant their societal downfall, which could have,
in turn, led to the end of Edward III’s reign if he did
not address the situation. So, Edward III implemented
policies, such as the “Ordinance” and “Statute of Labor-
ers” to reinforce the societal status quo. If, in the quest
for maintenance of the established social order, elites
sought to retain their power and authority, Edward
III, in turn, sought to retain support for his policies.
Each side gained what was most important to them,
the implications of which can be seen in his tactics to
more fully control England’s economy and to defend
and expand his holdings on the continent via war with
France, both of which fundamentally depended on elite
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support.
As seen above, the immediate economic effects of
the Black Death, such as the rising wages of laborers,
the decreased agricultural production, and the reduc-
tion of rent income resulted in an overall loss of profits
for landholders. The “Ordinance” and “Statute of La-
borers” were both efforts to counteract these effects,
because, as noted by W.M. Ormrod, the king was con-
cerned with recreating “the economic conditions that
had prevailed before the plague”22. In the decade prior
to the plague, the king and the elites had managed an
economic system that brought them prosperity; they co-
operated to ensure both their needs were met in terms
of power and wealth for the nobles and gentry and
adequate elite backing for the king33. When, after the
Black Death, the peasants began to push against the
established system, it upset not only the elites but the
king as well. In fact, the Calendar of the Patent Rolls men-
tions the king “resist[ing] the sloth and malice of ser-
vants who when others died in the pestilence seeing
the necessity of their lords would not serve them un-
less they received excessive stipends”34. This parallels
the sentiment of the nobility that the Rochester chroni-
cler captured when writing about the peasants seeking
higher wages20. Peasants were viewed by the Crown,
nobles, and gentry alike as being selfish; they refused
to continue working for the same low wages as before
the plague because they were going against the system
that the elites had built to benefit themselves. Mainte-
nance of the status quo in agrarian areas mattered to the
king, not only in order to appease the elites, but also be-
cause he was a landholder himself, and was, therefore,
directly impacted by the peasant demands for higher
wages. He was, in fact, the largest landholder in the
realm. Technically, the monarchy owned all the land in
England since the Norman Conquest, but that was not a
feasible system to operate under. It was during the reign
of Henry II that the system for managing the Crown’s
estate that Edward III used was established. The king
would grant pieces of the royal estate through tenurial
arrangements to royal servants whom he wished to ele-
vate in status, such as when he appointed new earls. By
the mid-fourteenth century, the most important grants
of the royal estate were to endow other members of the
royal family, so the majority of those lands were still
connected to the king. Because of just how much land
the king owned, even with such grants, he still had the
largest land holdings in the realm35;36. Therefore, the
economic issues created in the aftermath of the Black
Death were of concern to Edward III both because he
had to keep his elites satisfied with their economic sta-
tus and wealth and because it directly impacted the
management of his own lands and familial lands which
reflected his own status, power, and wealth in the coun-
try.
The king’s efforts to institute greater economic con-
trols also extended to the control of prices. Beyond any
ideological element, Edward III might have noticed that
higher wages often meant higher prices and, therefore,
believed that artificially lowering the wages would also
lower the prices of foodstuffs. Knighton recorded in
1349 that “the necessities of life became so dear, that
what in previous times was worth 1d. now cost 4d.
or 5d"9. This inflation was yet another economic con-
sequence of the Black Death. We have seen how the
spread of the plague decreased agricultural production,
which in turn caused the food supply to be diminished
below the necessary levels to sustain the population.
Price inflation, therefore, seems like a natural response
to having less supply than demand; however, medieval
England did not function with the theories of a modern
market-based economy. It functioned with the medieval
economic concept of balance: stable wages and prices
meant that the system was working as the elites had
built it to. Rising wages and rising prices in the wake of
the Black Death signaled a substantial disruption to the
established economic system. Because economics and
politics were inseparable, Edward III felt the need to use
his economic power, which was theoretically absolute,
to control both wages and prices in order to reestablish
balance within the economy37. One of the king’s at-
tempts to lower prices was the issuance of two statutes
in 1351, the “Free Trade Statute” and the “Statute of
Forestallers”38. Combined, these two laws protected
free trade without interference and punished anyone
who forestalled (buying victuals before they reached
the market, intending to resell them later at a higher
price)1. Edward III’s goal with these was to decrease the
prices of foodstuffs1. That, however, did not take place.
Grain prices remained high for years after the issuance
of these laws. From the early 1340s to the early 1370s,
grain prices rose by forty-three percent. When wages
were on the rise, the rise in prices would have meant
that the real wages were about the same as prior to
the Black Death39. Instead, because wages were forced
down by the Crown, the real wages actually decreased,
leaving the peasants worse off than were before the
plague. These policies were not successful in driving
down prices as Edward III had intended, which meant
that he would have to find other ways to control the
economy. However, the success of the labor regulations
balanced out this failure and gave the king and the elites
enough control over the economy to placate their needs
for power over the peasants for decades to come.
But it was not just out of a concern for the mainte-
nance of the social structure that Edward III tried to con-
trol the economy, he also had another specific economic
agenda tied to his political agenda: the Hundred Years’
War. By the time the plague arrived in 1348, Edward III
and Philip VI, king of France, had been at war for just
over ten years, only the beginning of what would be
a century-long ordeal. There were two major points of
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contention between the French and English monarchs:
longstanding feudal land issues and the succession of
the French throne. The English kings had been the noble
lords of Aquitaine since the eleventh century, but be-
ginning in the middle of the thirteenth century, a series
of French kings had slowly but relentlessly seized that
land, until it was fully under French control, thus mak-
ing the English kings nobles under the French kings.
This situation and the ensuing land disputes created a
strained political situation between the two countries
because one monarch cannot be beholden to another
monarch and retain the same level of power. Adding
to this was the dispute over the French throne: Edward
III had a strong claim to it when his uncle, Charles IV
died with no direct heirs, but the French chose Philip
of Valois as his successor instead. Political tensions be-
tween the two countries came to a head in 1337 when
Philip VI seized Aquitaine, which was the property of
the kings of England in their role as dukes since the
twelfth century, and in retaliation, Edward III declared
himself king of France2. For the remainder of his reign,
the war would be a key priority for Edward III because
war was a good way to manage the balance of power
between himself and the nobles.
Edward III quickly learned that making war is expen-
sive. Throughout the war, the English had troops on the
continent in Gascony, their last major crown holding
on the continent, and in Calais, which they captured
in 1347, just before the arrival of the plague2. Those
troops required routine supplies to keep the war effort
going. Calais and Gascony were both heavily depen-
dent on England for victuals, which the Crown had
to pay for2. Even though the royal government paid
less than the market price, the prices were still, to some
extent, regulated by the market. Therefore, the king
was concerned with changes in the market40. The rising
prices after the Black Death meant that the royal govern-
ment would have to pay more for the supplies needed
for the military. Thus, Edward III’s efforts to diminish
wages through the “Ordinance” and “Statute of Labor-
ers” was based on a desire to reduce grain prices, not
just because he was worried about having to pay more
at home, but because he was worried about having to
pay more for victuals to supply the military efforts of
the Hundred Years’ War.
The two main ways by which the Crown raised sup-
plies were purveyance and taxation. Purveyance was
when officers of the central government would go to
a county, as specified by the king, to purchase a des-
ignated number of victuals for lower than the mar-
ket price, and the counties were required to provide
these supplies40. The king would regularly issue pur-
veyances to supply the war effort. For example, in Jan-
uary 1347 the king issued a “licence [sic] for Bernard
. . . to take from the port of Sandwich 700 quarters of
wheat . . . to Gascony for the sustenance of [the] men
there in the king’s service”41. Taxation, on the other
hand, was the principal way in which the Crown made
money. The lay subsidy was the tax levied to finance the
war; it was not levied every year, but once the Hundred
Years’ War began, it became a considerable burden for
the peasantry, even before the additional challenges in
the aftermath of the Black Death5. However, Edward
III would not have been able to fund his war in this way
without the support of England’s elites. Taxes could not
be levied without the approval of the nobles and gentry
in Parliament, and he needed local officials to collect
the victuals ordered in each purveyance29. The English
elites supported the king’s war with France and allowed
the burdensome taxations and purveyances to fund it
because participation in the war helped them achieve
their fundamental goal of maintaining and growing
their wealth and power. Just as Edward III was seek-
ing additional political and economic power by going
to war with France, so too were the nobles and gentry
who supported him. The give-and-take structure of the
political sphere in England was crucial to the king’s
war-making efforts. Neither side could, therefore, af-
ford to lose wealth, land, and power over the peasantry,
which was the consequence if they refused to cooperate
in their political endeavors.
Beyond financing the war, the king also needed sol-
diers and military leadership to wage war. The nobles
and gentry were crucial both for the skills as soldiers
and their role in raising and leading troops from across
England. By the mid-fourteenth century, the king and
elites could no longer require their tenants to serve in
the military based on feudal obligations, instead, they
had to convince them to join in other ways. The gen-
try were pivotal to the recruitment of foot soldiers for
the war because they were both in positions of author-
ity and had access to the masses; the recruiting agents
would emphasize the pay and potential for material
rewards from fighting to convince men to enlist vol-
untarily2. The nobles and gentry themselves partici-
pated in the war in positions of leadership. Those in
higher positions of social standing typically had higher
ranks in the military, but the war also presented an op-
portunity for advancement. If a knight or lesser noble
performed well in the war, their social status could be
elevated from the prestige and material goods won in
the war31. One of the best examples of how knights
earned prestige is with the creation of the Order of the
Garter. In 1349, amidst the chaos of the plague, Edward
III formed the Order of the Garter “made up of himself
and his sons and the bravest and noblest in England,” as
Jean Froissart, an important chronicler of the Hundred
Year’s War, explained it42*. Twenty-four knights were
*There exists some debate over the actual founding date of the
Order. Froissart states that the Order of the Garter was formed in
1344, but modern historians typically put its founding in 1348 or 1349.
Despite this discrepancy in dates, the Order was still an important
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chosen as the founding members of the Order, all of
whom contributed to England’s military victory against
the French at Crécy in 1346. Membership in a chival-
ric order provided incredible prestige and glory to a
knight, not least of all, proximity to the king himself,
which is what all elites sought when fighting in war43.
The king thanked those who were successful in bat-
tle for furthering his agenda by rewarding them with
political advancement. The elites’ monetary gains of
war came mainly from significant booties and ransoms
because they were not paid salaries the way foot sol-
diers were. Because of the ample possibilities to increase
one’s social standing through fighting, war became the
principal activity for many elites during Edward III’s
reign. It was important to them to take any opportunity
that they could to increase their authority and wealth
because the more powerful they were, the more secure
their position was in society for themselves and their
children31. It was the promise of glory, prestige, and
profits for both the king and the elites that guaranteed
their cooperation throughout the war.
The Black Death and its mass mortality, however,
nearly stopped the war; military activity paused from
1348 to 13552. Nonetheless, the troops in Gascony and
Calais remained, and continued to need supplies from
England. As we have seen, after the plague, agriculture
production in England diminished dramatically and
that impacted the Crown’s ability to collect victuals.
For example, in July 1350 the king appointed “Roger
Larcher to purvey 1000 quarters of wheat, 500 quar-
ters of oats, 200 carcasses of [beefs] and 200 bacon pigs
in the counties of Southampton and Wilts . . . to bring
the same to Gascony for the king’s lieges there,” how-
ever, the order was “vacated and nothing was done
thereof”44. Roger Larcher was unable to complete the
purveyance because of the food supply shortage that be-
gan in the wake of the Black Death. This, however, did
not dissuade Edward III from continuing purveyance
efforts. In early October 1350, “Nicholas Lambe [was
appointed] to purvey 40 quarters of wheat, 80 quar-
ters of oats and 20 cartloads of hay, in the counties of
Southampton and Wilts, for the passage to Gascony”45.
There is a stark contrast in the number of supplies re-
quired between these two purveyances. Such a differ-
ence is due to the king being made aware of the hard-
ships caused by the Black Death and having to lower
his expectations. The elites responsible for collecting the
first purveyance would have made it clear to him that
victuals in that amount could not have been provided
without causing undue hardship on the local peasants
and the elites themselves. In other words, the elites
could not support the larger purveyance requirement,
so the king lowered his demands because getting fewer
creation of the mid-fourteenth century, highlighting the value of
chivalry in Edward III’s royal government and agenda.
supplies with the support of the elites was better than
getting no supplies with the elites against him.
Edward III, however, could have stopped pur-
veyances altogether, allowing his people to keep their
food supplies and recover after the Black Death faster.
The fact he did not do this indicates that the war with
France was a greater priority than any concerns over
domestic welfare. For the king, the fight against the
French kings was a part of a larger effort to maintain
and elevate his social standing. The French monarchy
was seen as the aggressor, attempting to take what was
rightfully Edward III’s through his lineage2. It is clear
just how important it was by the fact that he denied the
chance to become the Holy Roman Emperor, “saying
that he would rather seek his rights” to the lands and
throne in France9. Additionally, throughout the more
general sources from the period, we can see how the
war had become a fundamental component of Edward
III’s reign. In Knighton’s Chronicle, the pages before and
after his discussion of the Black Death are about the
ongoing war9. And, even amidst his points about the
plague, Knighton comes back to the war. For example,
after telling of deaths in Avignon, he states that “in the
mean time the commons of Flanders . . . gained Bruges
by deceit, and beheaded and hanged those Flemings
whom . . . supported the king of England.” Then, “King
Edward assembled his army”9. By the time the plague
arrived, the war was, in fact, a part of the status quo.
And, therefore, it was expected that it would continue.
The king had invested most of his political clout into
the continuation of the war and was not going to give
it up simply because the Black Death caused delays.
The elites, also, continued to need the war to support
their insatiable desire for power and wealth. However,
they were unable to do this unless they continued to
control the peasantry; if the peasants did not continue
their agricultural work as they had before the plague,
society would lose its basic functionality, and the elites,
therefore, would be unable to pursue their higher goals.
All of this shows that the Crown’s intervention in
the post-Black Death economy and government was
a tactic to further the king’s own agenda. Edward III
meddled with prices and wages to repress the peasantry
and retain the nobles’ support both for the Hundred
Years’ War and more broadly. By doing this, the Crown
prevented the natural economic responses to the Black
Death. We can therefore see how the peasantry was
connected to elites and the Crown in the Middle Ages.
Without peasants doing their work in the lower parts of
society, the upper echelons of society could not function
as they were used to. The king and elites had a system
in place that allowed them both to pursue their goals
without encroaching upon each other. The Black Death,
and its impacts on peasants, disrupted that system. The
economic regulations put in place by Edward III in
the wake of the plague were intended to continue the
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repression of the peasants so that the elites and the king
could maintain their status quo and their pursuit of
power, prestige, and wealth.
4 CONCLUSION
The Black Death occurred in the middle of a tumul-
tuous century and only added to the chaos. The disease
itself killed at least a third of the population in England,
which had dramatic effects on the society and econ-
omy. The peasants that survived the pestilence were
presented with the potential to improve their lives. The
king and elites, displeased with the changes in the peas-
antry’s status, worked to counteract their gains in or-
der to preserve the status quo from before the Black
Death. Edward III meddled with the economy by reg-
ulating prices and wages, which halted the peasants’
advancements. This was all in an effort to maintain the
established social order that underpinned the king and
his aristocracies’ working relationship, a relationship
that allowed them each to pursue power and prestige,
all the while, controlling and limiting the peasants. The
natural ramifications of the Black Death, therefore, were
not able to play out in the ways that we would have
expected them to. When there is a struggle between nat-
ural economics and governmental policies, the Crown
wins to the detriment of the peasants.
By the mid-1350s, England probably thought that
they were done with the plague and its impacts, but
unbeknownst to them, they would face three more out-
breaks before the century was over. The brief taste of
power that the peasants got after the Black Death would
not be forgotten, and neither would the policies imple-
mented to repress them. When writing of the impacts
of the “Statute of Laborers,” Knighton noted that it
meant that wage-earning peasants “served their mas-
ters worse than ever before”9. Moreover, the ramifi-
cations of the first outbreak would continue to rever-
berate for decades to come. The “Statute of Laborers”
would be enforced throughout the second half of the
fourteenth century. This set the stage for the growth of
states’ ability to legislate and intervene in the lives of
peasants which, combined with other encroachments
on peasants’ lives, contributed to pushbacks against
the status quo of the elites. The most notable of these
would be the 1381 Peasants’ Revolt, the culmination of
grievances that had their origins in the aftermath of the
1348 outbreak of the plague.
In studying the aftermath of the Black Death, we
can see the way that the various systems that make up
a society interact. Nothing happens in isolation. One
person, or one place, or one event is always connected
to countless other pieces of society. This is how the
impacts of the plague on grain production could be
connected to the king passing labor regulation, which
was, in turn, connected to a personal political war across
the Channel. Peasants, gentry, nobles, and royalty were
all linked together when the Black Death devastated
England, and when one of them sought to change their
position in society, all the others were impacted and had
to react. The complex intertwining of society can seem
simple in a time of stability, but its true colors come out
during crises.
Crises, such as the Black Death, expose the elements
of a society that impact and inform governments’ de-
cisions. It all comes down to who has the power and
what their priorities are. As we have seen, in fourteenth-
century England, the king, the nobles, and the gentry
held the power; peasants, while the base of society, had
no palpable authority. This meant that despite their
slight gains immediately after the plague, the peasants
were always at the mercy of the elites. It was the elites’
perpetual quest for power, prestige, and wealth that
guided the implementation of the new economic regula-
tions. Very little concern was ever given to the peasants
and their livelihoods. And so, peasants continued to
be held down by the powerful elites, even though the
crisis could have been a time of change.
When we look at the Black Death today it is hard not
to draw parallels with our own crises. The current coro-
navirus pandemic is one of only a few pandemics that
have occurred in the past seven hundred years since the
Black Death. We could attempt to use this study of the
plague and its impacts on society to analyze the predica-
ment that faces our world now, but the modern disease
and the world it impacts are drastically different from
their medieval counterparts. Despite those differences,
we look for explanations, for ways to understand what
is happening in the world around us. One way this
study of the Black Death might be used to understand
the coronavirus pandemic is as a reminder that govern-
ment priorities do not always align with the priorities
of its constituents. We see how governments around
the world are attempting to manage the impacts of the
disease and we are already facing the economic and po-
litical consequences. Just like in the fourteenth century,
the way forward will be determined by the complex
interchanges of power that drive our modern world.
5 EDITOR’S NOTES
This article was peer reviewed.
REFERENCES
[1] Sharp, B. Famine and Scarcity in Late Medieval
and Early Modern England: The Regulation of Grain
Marketing, 1256-1631 (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2016).
[2] Allmand, C. The Hundred Years War: England and
France at War c.1300-c.1450 (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1988).
Leah DiCiesare
[3] Maddicott, J. R. Plague, Population and the English
Economy 1348-1350 (The Economic History Society,
London, 1977), 1 edn.
[4] Harvey, B. F. Introduction: The ‘crisis’ of the Early
Fourteenth Century. In Campbell, B. M. S. (ed.)
Before the Black Death: Studies in the “crisis” of the
Early Fourteenth Century (Manchester University
Press, Manchester, 1991).
[5] Dyer, C. Standards of Living in the Later Middle Ages:
Social Change in England c.1200-1520 (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1989).
[6] de’ Mussis, G. The Arrival of the Plague. In Hor-
rox, R. (ed.) The Black Death, 14–26 (Manchester
University Press, Manchester, 1994).
[7] le Baker, G. The Plague According to Geoffrey
Le Baker. In The Black Death, 80–82 (Manchester
University Press, Manchester, 1994).
[8] The Arrival of the Plague in Dorset. In Horrox, R.
(ed.) The Black Death, 63 (Manchester University
Press, Manchester, 1994).
[9] Knighton, H. Knighton’s Chronicle, 1337-1396 (Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford, 1995).
[10] Stubbs, T. The Plague in York. In Horrox, R. (ed.)
The Black Death, 65 (Manchester University Press,
Manchester, 1994).
[11] of Reading, J. The Plague According to John of
Reading. In The Black Death, 74–75 (Manchester
University Press, Manchester, 1994), horrox, ro
edn.
[12] of Avesbury, R. The Plague Spreads to London. In
Horrox, R. (ed.) The Black Death, 64–65 (Manchester
University Press, Manchester, 1994).
[13] Higden, R. The Arrival of the Plague near Bristol.
In Horrox, R. (ed.) The Black Death, 62–63 (Manch-
ester University Press, Manchester, 1994).
[14] The Plague Spreads. In Horrox, R. (ed.) The Black
Death, 63–64 (Manchester University Press, Manch-
ester, 1994).
[15] Mayer, M. Urban Migration in the Later Middle
Ages. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University 64, 980–
995 (2019).
[16] Postan, M. M. Medieval Agrarian Society in Its
Prime: England (Cambridge University Press, Lon-
don, 1966), 2 edn.
[17] Stone, D. Decision-Making in Medieval Agri-
culture (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005).
URL http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/du/
detail.action?docID=422751.
[18] An Immediate Fall in Revenue. In Horrox, R. (ed.)
The Black Death, 277–280 (Manchester University
Press, Manchester, 1994).
[19] The National Archives - Currency Converter:
1270–2017. URL http://www.nationalarchives.
gov.uk/currency-converter/.
[20] The Plague Seen from Rochester. In Horrox, R.
(ed.) The Black Death, 70–73 (Manchester University
Press, Manchester, 1994).
[21] Marc, B. Feudal Society (Routledge, New York,
2014), 2 edn.
[22] Ormrod, W. M. Pestilence and Politics, 1348-1358.
In Edward III (Yale University Press, New Haven,
2011).
[23] Thorold Rogers, J. & Rogers, A. L. . A History of
Agriculture and Prices in England from the Year after
the Oxford Parliament (1259) to the Commencement
of the Continental War (1793) (Clarendon Press, Ox-
ford, 1886), 1 edn.
[24] Ordinance of Laborers, 1349. In Beebe White, A.
& Notestein, W. (eds.) Source Problems in English
History, 141–146 (Harper Brothers Publishers, New
York London, 1915). URL http://hdl.handle.net/
2027/nyp.33433075857213.
[25] The Statute of Labourers, 1351. In Horrox, R. (ed.)
The Black Death, 312–316 (Manchester University
Press, Manchester, 1994).
[26] Palmer, R. C. English Law in the Age of the
Black Death, 1348-1381: A Transformation of Gover-
nance and Law (University of North Carolina Press,
Chapel Hill, NC, 1993).
[27] Given-Wilson, C. The English Nobility in the Late
Middle Ages: The Fourteenth-Century Political Com-
munity (Routledge, London, New York, 1996).
[28] Membrane 27: March 18, 1337, Westminster. In Cal-
endar of the Patent Rolls Preserved in the Public Record
Office: Edward III, Vol. 3: 1334-1338, 400 (H.M.S.O.,
London, 1895), 3 edn.
[29] Brown, A. L. The Governance of Late Medieval Eng-
land, 1272-1461 (Stanford University, Stanford, CA,
1989).
[30] Stubbs, W. Confirmation of the Charters. In Select
Charters and Other Illustrations of English Constitu-
tional History: From the Earliest Times to the Reign of
Edward the First, 487–497 (Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1884), 5 edn.
[31] Tuck, A. Crown and Nobility, 1272-1461 (Blackwell
Publishers, Oxford, 1999), 2 edn.
[32] Carpenter, D. A. The Plantagenet Kings. In Abu-
lafia, D. (ed.) The New Cambridge Medieval History,
316–327 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1999).
[33] Mortimer, I. The Perfect King: The Life of Edward III,
Father of the English Nation (Jonathan Cape, London,
2006).
[34] Membrane 10d: January 2, 1350, Havering Atte
Bower. In Calendar of the Patent Rolls Preserved in
the Public Record Office: Edward III, Vol. 8: 1348-1350,
456–457 (H.M.S.O., London, 1905), 8 edn.
[35] Wolffe, B. The Royal Demesne in English History:
The Crown Estate in the Governance of the Realm from
Meddling in the Post-Black Death Economy
the Conquest to 1509 (George Allen Unwin Ltd,
London, 1971).
[36] Ganshof, F. L. Feudalism (Longmans, Green and
Co, London, 1952).
[37] Wood, D. Medieval Economic Thought (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2004).
[38] 25 Edward III. Stat. 3. In Luders, A. (ed.) The
Statutes of the Realm: Printed by Command of His
Majesty King George the Third, in Pursuance of an Ad-
dress of the House of Commons of Great Britain. From
Original Records and Authentic Manuscripts, 314–315
(Dawsons of Pall Mall, London, 1810), 1 edn. URL
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/pst.000017915496.
[39] Munro, J. ‘Money Matters’: A Critique of the
Postan Thesis on Medieval Population, Prices, and
Wages. In Drendel, J. (ed.) Crisis in the Later Mid-
dle Ages (Brepols Publishers, Turnhout, Belgium,
2015), medieval c edn.
[40] Maddicott, J. R. The English Peasantry and the De-
mands of the Crown, 1294-1341 (Past and Present
Society, Oxford, 1975), past and p edn.
[41] Membrane 8: January 16, 1347, Eltham. In Calen-
dar of the Patent Rolls Preserved in the Public Record
Office: Edward III, Vol. 7: 1345-1348, 216 (H.M.S.O.,
London, 1903), 7 edn.
[42] Froissart, J. Froissart Chronicles (Penguin Books,
Suffolk, 1968).
[43] Saul, N. Chivalry in Medieval England Nigel Saul
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2011).
[44] Membrane 17: July 24, 1350, Westminster. In Calen-
dar of the Patent Rolls Preserved in the Public Record
Office: Edward III, Vol. 8: 1348-1350, 555 (H.M.S.O.,
London, 1905).
[45] Membrane 9: October 4, 1350, Westminster. In
Calendar of the Patent Rolls Preserved in the Public
Record Office: Edward III, Vol. 8: 1348-1350, 456–457
(H.M.S.O., London, 1905), 8 edn.
